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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
A REAPPRAISAL OF THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE
IN TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Whitney R. Harris*
T HE judicial review of administrative action in Texas has been
the subject of frequent' and sometimes critical' comment. It
has been suggested that in the oil and gas field, at least, too much
emphasis has been given to this aspect of the administrative proc-
ess while too little attention has been paid to agency practice and
procedure.8 However that may be, if personal and property rights
are to remain secure in the face of rapidly expanding govern-
mental controls exercised through administrative bodies,' realistic
resort to the courts must be available to test the legality of admin-
istrative regulations and to protect private parties from arbitrary
administrative action. The scope and effectiveness of such review
ultimately may determine the extent to which free economic enter-
prise is to be retained in America.'
Administrative restraints upon business are usually thought of
as being upon a national level. Without for a moment discounting
the tremendous control asserted by the federal government over
industry under recently broadened judicial definitions of inter-
state commerce, 6 it should not be overlooked that state governments
*Professor of Law, School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
I LIPscoMB, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMISTRATIVE ACTION IN TEXAs (1938) ; Scope
of Judicial Review of Railroad Commission Orders, 2 SOUTHWESTErN L. J., 278 (1948);
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 334 (1948).
2 Hyder, Exceptions to the Spacing Rule in Texas, 27 TEx. L. RFV. 481 (1949).
3 Davis and Willbern, Administrative Control of Oil Production in Texas, 22 Tix.
L. REv. 149, 150 (1944).
4 Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Senate
Document No. 8, 77th Congress, 1st Session (1941).
' Smith, Administrative Law: A Threat to Constitutional Government? 31 VA. L.
REv. 1 (1944).
6 Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100
(1940).
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likewise are making constantly increasing use of the administrative
process in the regulation of important segments of the economy.
Among the business activities subject to administrative supervision
in Texas are railroads, 7 motor carriers,' public utility gas compa-
nies,' the oil and gas industry, 0 appropriation of water,"' insur-
ance, 2 banking,"8 agriculture," aeronautics,' and securities, 6 not
to mention many licensing boards which control various trades
and professions. 7 A proper regard for the extensive inter-
ests thus subjected to administrative regulation demands adequate
judicial remedies against the possibility of arbitrary or unrea-
sonable administrative action.
In Texas there usually is no difficulty in obtaining judicial re-
view of administrative action which affects private rights. Review
is commmonly provided for by statutes which may call for a trial
de novo,'8 for a suit or trial as in other civil causes, 9 or simply
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6444, et seq.
8 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 911a and 911b.
9 TAX. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6050, et seq.
10 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6004, et seq.
i1 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 7467, et seq.
12 TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4 679a, et seq.
is TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 342-103, et seq.
14 Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 47, et seq., art. 1287-1, art. 5562, et seq.
15 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 46c.1, et seq.
'a TaX. REy. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 600a.
17 Including: architects, attorneys, barbers, chiropodists, dentists, embalmers, em-
ployment and labor agents, engineers, hairdressers and cosmetologists, insurance agents,
land surveyors, librarians, liquor dealers, nurses, optometrists, pharmacists, physicians,
plumbers, real estate dealers, securities salesmen, teachers, transportation brokers, and
veterinarians.
18 Workmen's Compensation Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307,
§ 5, (and see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6674s, § 11) ; Liquor Control
Act, Tax. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) arts. 666-5, 666-14, 667-6; Motor Vehicle Operators
Act, TEX. Ray. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 6687b, § 31; State Board of Hairdressers
and Cosmetologists, Tax. PEN. Coo (Vernon, 1948) art. 734b, § 16; State Bank Board,
Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 342-115; Awards of County Commissioner's
Courts, Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 2372g.1.
19 Motorbus Act, Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 911a; Motor Carriers
Act, Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 911b; Oil and Gas Conservation, T=x
REV. Civ. STAT (Vernon, 1948) art. 6049c-8, art. 6008, § 24, art. 6008a, § 6; Railroads,
Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 6452, 6453, 6454; Gas Utility Rates, TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6059; State Banking Commissioner, TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 342-805; Petroleum Storage Facilities, TEX. Rzv. Cirv. STAT.
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for an appeal."0 And in the absence of statutory review, the courts
have generally found methods by which parties aggrieved may
gain their day in court.21 Of principal concern to private litigants
is the scope of review allowed when a case involving an alleged
abuse of administrative authority is properly before the court. Of
course, a judicial remedy is always available to correct or avoid ad-
ministrative action which is contrary to a provision of the constitu-
tion," involves an error of law," or is in excess of jurisdiction."
(Vernon, 1948) art. 6049a, § 12; State Board of Dental Examiners, TEX. REV. Crv. STAT.
(Vernon, 1948) art. 4549 (cf. TEx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) art. 752c, § 5) ; State
Board of Chiropody Examiners, Trx. R~v. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4573; Boards
of Adjustment (Zoning), TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1011g (cf. TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 46e.11); Board of Barber Examiners, TEX. PFN. CODE
(Vernon, 1948) art. 73 4a, § 22a; Board of Insurance Commissioners, TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4893.
20 The Securities Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 600a, § 28; Board
of Insurance Commissioners, TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4698a, § 11 and
art. 4682b, § 10; State Board of Pharmacy, Tinx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art.
4542a, § 12; Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Ver-
non, 1948) art. 4563.
21 In a proper case the validity of a statute establishing an administrative procedure
may be called in question by a suit for declaratory relief. City of Fort Worth v. Fire
Department, 213 S. W. (2d) 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), reversed in part on other
grounds, Fire Department of the city of Fort Worth v. City of Fort Worth, 147 Tex. 505,
217 S. W. (2d) 664 (1949). Under some circumstances, a writ of mandamus may be
obtained to compel an administrative agency to take action required of it as a matter of
law. Louder v. Texas Liquor Control Board, 214 S. W. (2d) 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
writ of error refused; State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers v. Hatter,
139 S. W. (2d) 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Suits for injunctive relief are commonly
filed to restrain administrative agencies where the action taken, or threatened, is alleged
to be ultra vires, or the statute, act or ordinance pursuant to which the action is taken,
is alleged to be void. Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 214 S. W. (2d) 282
(1948); Board of Insurance Commissioners v. Texas Emp. Ins. Assn., 144 Tex. 543,
192 S. W. (2d) 149 (1946) ; Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S. W. (2d) 451
(1948) ; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Shannon, 100 Tex. 379, 100 S. W. 138 (1907);
Board of Water Engineers v. McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 229 S. W. 301 (1921) ; Leach v.
Coleman, 188 S. W. (2d) 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) writ of error refused, want of
merit; Bexar County v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 213 S. W. (2d) 882 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948) writ of error refused, no reversible error.
22 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 120 S. W. 1028 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) writ of
error refused; Texas Consol. Theatres v. Pittilo, 204 S. W. (2d) 396 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947).
23 As in the case of the "more wells, more oil" theory of exceptions to the oil well
spacing rule of the Railroad Commission. Hawkins v. Texas Company, 146 Tex. 511,
518, 209 S. W. (2d) 338, 343 (1948), and cases there cited.
24 Board of Insurance Commissioners v. Texas Emp. Ins. Assn., 144 Tex. 543, 192
S. W. (2d) 149 (1946) ; Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S. W. (2d) 451 (1948) ;
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 133 Tex. 330, 128 S. W. (2d) 9
(1939) ; Davis v. San Antonio & G. S. By. Co., 92 Tex. 642, 51 S. W. 324 (1899).
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But the justness or reasonableness-the fairness-of administrative
action most frequently turns upon an evaluation of fact issues. And
the extent to which judicial review is of practical protection to per-
sons subject to administrative control thus depends in great part
upon the scope of review which the courts allow upon questions of
fact. In Texas, judicial review of administrative determinations
of fact is commonly said to be by the "substantial evidence rule."
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Before considering the substantial evidence rule in Texas ad-
ministrative law, it may be helpful to point out briefly the meaning
and extent of that doctrine in federal administrative law, since
the phrase "substantial evidence," insofar as it has become the
catchword of judicial review of administrative action, owes its
prominence to federal legal usage.25
A large number of federal administrative statutes use the words
"substantial evidence" or the equivalent thereof in prescribing
limitations upon judicial review of administrative fact findings.26
Even where the act provides that the findings of fact of the agency
shall be final or conclusive the courts have read into the law a
qualification that such findings must be supported by substantial
evidence. For example, the National Labor Relations Act provides
that the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evi-
dence, shall be conclusive." In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Na.
tional Labor Relations Board,2" Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speak-
ing for the Supreme Court, said of this act:
25Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. oF PA. L REv.
1026 (1941).
26 "Not only the Labor Relations Act but also some eighteen other federal statutes
have set up the substantial evidence standard for judicial review of fact decisions of the
administrative agencies in charge." STASON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON AmiNIS-
TRATIVE TRIiUNALS, note, page 610 (2nd ed. 1947).
27 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(e).
28 305 U. S. 197,229 (1938).
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"We agree that the statute, in providing that 'the findings of the
Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive,'
means supported by substantial evidence. Washington, V. & M. Coach
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147. Sub-
stantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion."
A somewhat different quality of review has been prescribed
by the Supreme Court for rate cases in which the utility contends
that the rates fixed by the administrative body are so low as to be
confiscatory of its property. In such cases the court has held that
there must be an independent judicial review of the facts and the
law by courts of competent jurisdiction to the end that the consti-
tution may be maintained as the supreme law of the land.29 In
rate cases there is a strong presumption in favor of the conclusions
reached by an experienced administrative body after a full hear-
ing,"0 the complaining party carries the burden of making a con-
vincing showing, and the court will not interfere unless confiscation
is clearly established;" but the courts cannot be required by
statute to accept findings of the commission as final even when
supported by substantial evidence. 2
Judicial review of administrative determinations of fact in the
federal courts normally is based upon the record adduced before
20 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936).
30 Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U. S. 564 (1917).
3' Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U. S. 287 (1933);
Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934) ; Dayton Power & Light
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 292 U. S. 290 (1934).
82 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936). The court has
refused to permit federal courts to exercise independent judicial review in oil and gas
cases in which it is alleged that the order of a state administrative agency is confiscatory
of property rights in oil, where the controlling statute affords the possibility of ade-
quate review in the state courts. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil
Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940) ; Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.,
311 U. S. 570 (1941) ; but ci. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S.
55 (1936). And see Sumners, Does the Regulation of Oil Production Require the Denial
of Due Process and the Equal Protection of the Laws? 19 TEx. L. Rev. 1 (1940), Davis,
Judicial Emasculation of Administrative Action and Oil Proration; Another View, 19
Tax. L. R-v. 29 (1940), and Hardwicke, Oil Conservation: Statutes, Administration
and Court Review, 13 Miss. L. J. 381 (1941).
[Vol. 3
1949] REAPPRAISAL OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE 421
the administrative body. If no constitutional rights are involved,
the findings of the agency may be made conclusive upon the courts,
in which case judicial inquiry goes no further than to ascertain
whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
findings. A finding of fact which is not based upon substantial evi-
dence is arbitrary, and a person whose rights are adversely af-
fected by an order founded upon such a finding is deprived of his
rights without due process of law in the procedural sense.
Where constitutional rights of liberty or property are involved,
however, regard to the supremacy of the constitution necessitates
the exercise of independent judicial judgment upon the facts. Not
only are the parties entitled to a fair hearing before the agency,
with findings based upon substantial evidence, but they are like-
wise entitled to a judicial determination of whether they have been
deprived of rights without due process of law considered in the
substantive sense. This does not "require or justify" disregard of
the considered conclusions of the commission based upon evidence
after a full administrative hearing. There is a strong presumption
in favor of the conclusions of the agency and the court is not, even
where constitutional rights are in issue, merely to substitute its
judgment for that of the commission. The complaining party car-
ries the burden of making a convincing showing and the court will
not interfere with the action complained of unless the invasion of
a constitutional right is clearly established.
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE IN TEXAS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The substantial evidence rule in Texas administrative law, stated
broadly, means that in all cases of direct attack upon administrative
orders, whether pursuant to statutory appeal or by special writ or
remedy in the absence of statutory appeal, the trial court is limited
to the determination of whether, from all the evidence adduced in
the trial of the cause before the court, the action of the agency is
illegal, arbitrary, or capricious, or is not reasonably supported by
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
substantial evidence.8" If reasonable minds could not have reached
the conclusion that the agency must have reached in order to justify
its action the order must be set aside.34 A full retrial of fact issues
is required in the trial court, and it is to the record adduced be-
fore the court rather than to the record adduced before the
agency, that the substantial evidence principle is applied."
The substantial evidence rule is of comparatively recent origin
in Texas. In the early cases involving judicial review of adminis-
trative action the courts complied strictly with the statutory provi-
sions for review.3" Fact issues passed upon by the agency were
subject to judicial inquiry, but the courts gave prima facie validity
to commission findings, placed the burden upon the party com-
plaining to show the unreasonableness or unjustness of the order,
and refused to substitute judicial judgment for agency discre-
tion. 7 In cases involving railroad rates fixed by the Railroad Com-
Texas Liquor Control Board v. Floyd, 117 S. W. (2d) 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Railroad Commission v. Metro Bus Lines, 144 Tex. 420, 191 S. W. (2d) 10 (1945)
Hawkins v. Texas Company, 146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. (2d) 338 (1948) ; Blair v. Board
of Trustees, 161 S. W. (2d) 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
31 Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S. W. (2d) 1022 (1942)
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S. W. (2d) 424 (1946).
3.' Miller v. Tarry, 191 S. W. (2d) 501 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) writ of error refused,
no reversible error; Hawkins v. Texas Company, 146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. (2d) 338
(1948).
:11Railroad Commission v. Galveston Chamber of Commerce, 105 Tex. 101, 145
S. W. 573 (1912) ; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State, 255 S. W. 390 (Tex. Com.
App. 1923) ; San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 275 S. W. 261 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925) ; Railroad Commission v. Houston Chamber of Commerce, 124 Tex. 375,
78 S. W. (2d) 591 (1935).
:17 Thns in State v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas, 165 S. W. 491 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1913), writ of error dismissed, the court said: "The findings of fact found by the
trial court as to reasonableness and public necessity were the reverse of those found by
us. Ordinarily we would feel bound by the findings of fact by the trial court, unless it
c:early appeared that such findings were wrong. In this case, however, we regard the
Railroad Commission as occupying the place ordinarily occupied by a trial court. The
duty devolved upon it primarily to ascertain the facts. The suit before the district court
upon appellees' answer was in the nature of an appeal from the findings of the commis.
!on. The statute provides that in such suits the burden rests upon the party complain-
ing of the orders of the commission to show, 'by clear and satisfactory evidence,' that
the orders complained of are unjust and unreasonable. Article 6658, R. S. 1911; Commis.
sion v. Chamber of Commerce, 105 Tex. 101, 145 S. W. 580; Ry. Co. v. Commission, 102
Tex. 353, 113 S. W. 741, 116 S. W. 795. The findings of fact by the commission upon
which its orders are based are to be taken as prima facie correct. Revisory power is
lodged in the court, but 'it was not intended that we (nor the trial court) should substi-
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mission the burden was placed by statute upon the party complain-
ing of the rate to prove that it was unjust or unreasonable as to
him." Where the party complaining sustained this burden the
order was set aside;89 where he failed, the order was affirmed."
The courts seem to have encountered no real difficulty in following
the statutory scheme of review in these early cases, and in none of
them was reference made to the doctrine of "substantial evi-
dence."
The substantial evidence rule initially arose out of cases in-
volving orders of the Railroad Commission upon applications for
certificates of public convenience and necessity for motor trans-
portation services over state highways. The leading case under the
motor bus laws is Shupee v. Railroad Commission,4 decided in
tute our judgment for that of the commission every time there is a dispute touching the
particular place on the line of a railroad where it would be best for the public interest
that a station or a depot should be placed.' Ry. Co. v. Ry. Com., 109 La. 247, 33 South.
214. In this case the evidence is conflicting; hence our findings of fact are made in con-
formity with the facts found by the Railroad Commission." On rehearing, the court clari-
fied its remarks as follows: "We did not mean to say that we were called upon to review
the evidence adduced before the commission. We have no knowledge as to what such
evidence was. The only testimony in the record is that given in the district court upon
the trial of this case, and upon such trial it would not have been permissible to prove
what was testified to before the Railroad Commission, except by way of impeaching a
witness. What we meant by the language above quoted is that, inasmuch as the statute
makes the orders of the commission binding, unless the party complaining of the same
shall prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that they are unreasonable and unjust to
him, an appellate court must indulge in favor of such orders all the presumptions that
are given by law to the judgment of a trial court. That is to say, it must be presumed that
an order so made was justified by the facts in the case, until the contrary is clearly and
satisfactorily shown by the testimony adduced in the district court in a suit to set aside
such order."
38 "In all trials under the foregoing article the burden of proof shall rest upon the
plaintiff, who must show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the rates, regulations,
orders, classifications, acts or charges complained of are unreasonable and unjust to it
or them." TEax. REV. Civ. STAT., art. 4566 (1911).
39 Railroad Commission v. Galveston Chamber of Commerce, 115 S. W. 94 (Tex..
Civ. App. 1908) writ of error refused; Railroad Commission v. Houston Chamber of
Commerce, 124 Tex. 375, 78 S. W. (2d) 591 (1935).
40 Railroad Commission v. Galveston Chamber of Commerce, 105 Tex. 101, 145
S. W. 573 (1912). The same approach was taken by the courts in cases involving com-
mission orders for the erection of depots. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State, 255
S. W. 390 (Tex. Com. App. 1923) ; San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission,
.275 S. W. 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
'1 123 Tex. 521, 73 S. W. (2d) 505 (1934) ; and note companion cases, Texas Motor
Coaches v. Railroad Commission, 123 Tex. 517, 73 S. W. (2d) 511 (1934) and Texas and
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1934, in which the court held that if the findings and orders of the
commission had any reasonable basis in fact, and were not shown
to be arbitrary and unreasonable, they must be supported by the
court. No direct reference was made to "substantial evidence" in
the opinion of the Supreme Court in that case, or in the opinion
of the Court of Civil Appeals, written by Justice Blair, which it
approved. 2 In a companion case under the motor carrier laws,
however, Justice Blair declared:"
"And as held in the Shupee Case, the appeal sections of the act
are similar and are interpreted to mean that the court on appeal
shall not interfere with the Railroad Commission or review its acts
or orders administering the Motor Transportation Acts further than
is necessary to keep it within the law, and to require that its orders
shall be based upon substantial evidence, and not upon an arbitrary
exercise of its discretionary power and authority." (Emphasis sup-
plied).
This first reference to "substantial evidence" by Justice Blair
constituted a restatement of the rule of the Shupee case and was
made in response to an argument that under the statute the court
was "to put itself in the place of the commission to try the admin-
istrative matter of granting the increase schedules anew as an
administrative body, substituting its findings with regard to a
public convenience and necessity for the service, based upon a
preponderance of evidence adduced on the appeal and trial de
novo, for those of the commission."44 Justice Blair stated quite
consistently with previous decisions of the Supreme Court that
"such is not the principle on which the court acts on the statutory
appeals." Special significance to "substantial evidence" appears
not to be warranted from the use of the words in this case.45 In
Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. Railroad Commission, 124 Tex. 126, 73 S. W. (2d) 509
(1934).
42 Railroad Commission v. Shupee, 57 S. W. (2d) 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
48 Railroad Commission v. Winkle, 57 S. W. (2d) 285, 287 (Tex. Civ. App, 1933).
44 Id. at 287.
45 Shortly after the Shupee decision the Supreme Court invalidated an order of the
Railroad Commission which had prescribed group rates on sugar and molasses ship.
ments originating in certain cities in the Houston area of the state. The appeal had been
[Vol. 3
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motor carrier cases arising after the Shupee decision, however, the
statement that the order should be sustained if supported by sub-
stantial evidence was used with increasing frequency, 6 although it
was acknowledged that the rule "might appear to do violence to
the language" of the statute. 7
The substantial evidence rule seems first to have appeared in
the oil and gas cases, as in the motor carrier cases, through an
opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. In Brown v. Humble Oil
Company,4 decided in 1935, the Supreme Court declared that the
test to be applied on review of orders of the Railroad Commission
under its spacing rule49 was whether the action of the commission
was illegal, unreasonable, or arbitrary. On the second appeal in
that case, the Court of Civil Appeals said that5"
"the trial in the district court must be confined to the question as to
whether or not the commission acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
unjustly. The court is not a regulatory body, and cannot act as such.
It merely reviews the action of the commission, and, if upon the trial
in the district court it appears that the commission's action is sustained
by substantial probative evidence, then the action of the commission
should not be overturned." (Emphasis supplied).
taken to the trial court under a statute which provided that the case should be tried and
determined as other civil causes with the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to show that
the order complained of was unreasonable and unjust as to it. By applying the statutory
presumption of validity and the statutory burden of proof, the court had no difficulty in
protecting the rights of the parties aggrieved by the administrative order, without resort
to the substantial evidence rule. Railroad Commission v. Houston Chamber of Commerce,
124 Tex. 375, 78 S. W. (2d) 591 (1935).
46 Army Post Bus Lines v. Railroad Commission, 158 S. W. (2d) 872 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942) writ of error re/used; North East Texas Motor Lines v. Texas-Pacific Motor
Transport Co., 159 S. W. (2d) 926 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); English v. Railroad Commis.
sion, 219 S. W. (2d) 481 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
47 Railroad Commission v. Metro Bus Lines, 144 Tex. 420, 191 S. W. (2d) 10
(1946). The statute provides expressly that the party complaining of the order shall
prove that it is unreasonable and unjust by the preponderance of the evidence. Tax.
REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 911a, § 16, and art. 911b, § 20.
48 126 Tex. 296, 83 S. W. (2d) 935 (1935).
49 The Railroad Commission has statutory authority to make rules for the conser-
vation of oil and gas resources. Tx. REy. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6029. The com-
mission's Rule 37, issued after hearings, establishes a spacing rule for the drilling of
wells, and reserves to the commission the power to grant exceptions to prevent waste or
the confiscation of property (formerly, to protect vested rights).
50 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 112 S. W. (2d) 222, 225
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937) writ of error dismissed.
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By 1939 the Supreme Court was using similar phraseology. In
Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., decided in that year,
the court said:51
"The court, on appeal from the Commission's order, should not
set aside an order of the Commission either granting or refusing to
grant a well permit unless such order is illegal, unreasonable, or
arbitrary. In so far as the fact findings upon which the order is
based are concerned, the order is not illegal, unreasonable, or arbi-
trary if it is reasonably supported by substantial evidence. Stated in
another way, the court does not act as an administrative body to
determine whether or not it would have reached the same fact con-
clusion that the Commission reached, but will consider only whether
the action of the Commission in its determination of the facts is
reasonably supported by substantial evidence."
It is unnecessary, for the purposes of this paper, to trace the
history of the rule through the vagaries of the oil litigation,-the
Trem Carr,52 Marrs,"5 and Trapp4 cases, and their progeny,65 or
to recount here the oft-told story of the unsuccessful struggle
waged by former Chief Justice Alexander to obtain for Texas a
more generous scope of review than the other members of the Su-
preme Court were willing to accord parties complaining of admin-
istrative action. Nor is it profitable now to speculate to what extent
the imposing task of full relitigation of administrative matters in
the courts, with consequent drain upon the time and energy of
judges already burdened with heavy calendars, may have induced
the other members of the court to part with Chief Justice Alexan-
der on this issue so important to the development of Texas admin-
istrative law. Suffice it to say that the rule of the Gulf Land Co.
case, as restated and re-emphasized by the court in Hawkins v.
5 1134 Tex. 59, 74, 131 S. W. (2d) 73, 82 (1939).
52 Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S. W. (2d) 1022 (1942).
53 Marrs v. Railroad Commission, 142 Tex. 293,177 S. W. (2d) 941 (1944).
54 Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S. W. (2d) 424 (1946).
"5 Thomas v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 145 Tex. 270, 198 S. W. (2d) 420 (1946);
Potter v. Sun Oil Co., 144 Tex. 151, 189 S. W. (2d) 482 (1945); Cook Drilling Co. v.
Gulf Oil Corporation, 139 Tex. 80, 161 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1942) ; Railroad Commission
- Wencker, 140 Tex. 527, 168 S. W. (2d) 625 (1943).
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Texas Company, decided in 1948, is law today. In the case last
cited the court again declared that"
"the finding of the Commission will be sustained by the court if it
is reasonably supported by substantial evidence, meaning evidence
introduced in court. The word 'reasonably' has been deliberately
used in the statement and its use gives to the judicial review a
broader scope than it would have if some substantial evidence were
regarded sufficient of itself to sustain the Commission's order. It is
for the court to determine as a matter of law the reasonableness of
the support afforded by substantial evidence.. .. In making its deci-
sion of this question the court examines and takes into consideration
all of the evidence, the entire record."
Cases arising under the Texas Liquor Control Act67 are in a
category somewhat different from the motor carrier cases and are
clearly distinguishable from the oil and gas cases. The Supreme
Court has pointed out that a license to sell intoxicants is not a
property right, but a privilege granted by the state, 8 and it has
been said that
"the only jurisdiction which a court has over the power of the
administrative board to cancel a liquor permit or license is to deter-
mine whether the board acted within the scope of its delegated
authority, based its order or conclusion upon substantial evidence,
and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in making its order." 9
With one recent exception,6 0 courts which have considered ap-
peals under this statute have applied the substantial evidence
rule.6" And it has been suggested that if the statute required the
146 Tex. 511, 513, 209 S. W. (2d) 338, 340 (1948).
TEx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) arts. 666-14 and 667-6. The act provides for trial
de novo "under the same rules as ordinary suits."
.State v. DeSilva, 105 Tex. 95, 145 S. W. 330 (1912).
Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board, 108 S. W. (2d) 300, 303 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
60 Texas Liquor Control Board v. Saiz, 220 S. W. (2d) 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
1 Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board, 108 S. W. (2d) 300 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Texas Liquor Control Board v. Jones, 112 S. W. (2d) 227 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Texas Liquor Control Board v. Floyd, 117 S. W. (2d) 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
State v. Peeler, 200 S. W. (2d) 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Louder v. Texas Liquor Con-
trol Board, 214 S. W. (2d) 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Ramos v. Austin, 220 S. W.
(2d) 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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courts to grant a trial de novo wholly without regard to the action
of the board, as in workmen's compensation cases, "it would be
unconstitutional as an attempt on the part of the Legislature to
confer administrative power and duties upon the judicial depart-
ment of the government."6
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss, however briefly,
the application of the substantial evidence rule in other fields,"
but certain exceptions to the rule should be noted. The first of
these is the review of decisions of the Industrial Accident Board."
The courts have construed the Workmen's Compensation Act to
mean that the proceeding in court to review decisions of the Indus-
trial Accident Board shall be de novo, "wholly without reference
to what may have been decided by the board," with requirement
upon the claimant to sustain the burden of proving his claim by
the preponderance of the evidence adduced in court.6" A second
exception is the review of decisions of the Board of Insurance
Commissioners relating to casualty insurance," and orders of the
Secretary of State under the Securities Act,"7 in which by statute
the courts are limited to the evidence adduced before the agencies
(and, in the case of the Secretary of State, such additional evi-
dence as the court in its discretion may receive) rather than to the
evidence adduced before the court. Another exception is the review
r- Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board, 103 S. W. (2d) 300, 302 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
1 :' The rule has been applied in other cases involving both statutory and non-statu-
tory judicial review. E.g., Consolidated Chemical Industries v. Railroad Commission,
201 S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ ol error relused, no reversible error
(re~ie w of order of Railroad Commission fixing a special railroad rate, confiscation not
i-. 6 .d) , City of San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery, 144 Tex. 281, 190 S. W. (2d) 67
1 945 '(r~vicw of order of board of adjustment denying permit under zoning law) ;
Blair v. Board of Trustees, 161 S. W. (2d) 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (review of order
of Board of Education discharging district superintendent of schools) ; Texas & New
Orhvan-; R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 220 S. W. (2d) 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949)
(review of order of Railroad Commission denying railroad's application to discontinue
service).
'4 Tvx. REV. CtV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 5; c/. TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT.
(Vernon. 1948) art. 6674s, § 11.
115 Booth v. Texas Employers' Ins. Assn., 132 Tex. 237, 123 S. W. (2d) 322 (1938).
"6 TEx. REv. CtV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948), art. 4698a, § 11.
67 TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 600a, § 28.
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of commission rate orders where the utility alleges that the rate
is unreasonable and unjust, or confiscatory, as to it. The Supreme
Court has held that in such cases the utility is entitled to an inde-
pendent determination of both law and fact.6" A final exception
is the express prohibition against use of the substantial evidence
rule on appeals from the recently created Texas Real Estate Com-
mission.69
REAPPRAISAL OF THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE
In the April, 1949, issue of the Texas Law Review, Mr. Elton M.
Hyder, Jr. writes:
"Our highest court, in the Trapp case departed from the rule of
de novo trial and returned to trial under the substantial evidence
rule. We are now approaching the nadir of a recurrent change of
policy. We are returning to the shores of the de novo trial. Those
shores are no longer, 'dimly seen.' ,,71
The shoreline, in his view, is the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Hawkins v. Texas Company.7 Mr. Hyder would construe
the substantial evidence rule (in Rule 37 cases) to mean that
" This exception arose out of prolonged litigation over gas utility rates fixed by the
Railroad Commission for the Lone Star Gas Company. State v. Lone Star Gas Co., 86
S. W. (2d) 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) writ of error refused; Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas,
304 U. S. 224 (1938) ; State v. Lone Star Gas Co., 129 S. W. (2d) 1164 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939) ; Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S. W. (2d) 681 (1941).
". "The substantial evidence rule shall not be used, and the right of trial by jury
shall be had in all cases when called for." S. B. No. 28, ch. 149, 51st Legislature, Regular
Session, Laws 1949.
70 Hvder, Snme Difieulties in the Application of the Exceptions to the Spacing
Rule in Texas, 27 Tax. L. REv. 481, 482 (1949).
71 146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. (2d) 338 (1948). Mr. Hyder states: "Although the
Trapp and Thomas decisions overruled the conflicting statements in the Trem Carr and
Marrs cases, and affirmed the rules announced in the Gulf Land Company case, the
Supreme Court has now abrogated such decisions and expressly returned to 'a reitera-
tion of the explanation of the substantial evidence rule made in Railroad Commission
v. Shell Oil Company, the Trem Carr case.'" Hyder, Some Difficulties in the Applica.
tion of the Exceptions to the Spacing Rule in Texas, 27 TEx. L. REv. 481, 493 (1949).
But Mr. Hyder seems to have overlooked that the "reiteration of the explanation of the
substantial evidence rule" made in the Trem Carr case was quoted with approval in the
opinion of the Court on rehearing in the Trapp case. Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex.
323, 349, 198 S. W. (2d) 424, 441 (1946).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
"as soon as a single witness testifies as to facts which sustain the
permit, and such testimony is without impeachment or perjury, and
is credible and reasonable of belief, after cross-examination, regard-
less of a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, the court
is to sustain the permit." 2
This "single-witness" theory, so often advanced by agency advo-
cates, has been rejected consistently by the courts." The "single
witness" theory would place an impossible burden upon persons
seeking relief from arbitrary administrative action. Where the
order in question involves technical considerations it is hard to
imagine any case in which it could not be supported by an expert
opinion which, standing alone, appeared "credible and reasonable
of belief." Only if the court is permitted to hear all relevant evi-
dence bearing upon the issue is there a fair opportunity to show
that the testimony of the expert, though he remain unimpeached,
is not credible or reasonable of belief.7" And whether the order is
reasonably supported by substantial evidence can scarcely be
determined save upon an examination of the full record. The
Supreme Court has quite properly rejected the "single-witness"
theory of substantial evidence.
The basic difficulty with the substantial evidence rule in Texas
is not that it requires an evaluation of the record considered "as
a whole," but that it is applied to a new record adduced before
the court which may differ in significant respects from the record
adduced before the agency. It is perfectly logical to test agency
findings of fact by the rule of substantial evidence when it is
72 Hyder, Some Difficulties in the Application of the Exceptions to the Spacing
Rule in Texas, 27 TEx. L. Rnv. 481, 490 (1949).
72 "The record is to be considered as a whole, and it is for the court to determine
what constitutes substantial evidence." Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex.
66, 79, 161 S. W. (2d) 1022, 1029 (1942); Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 349,
198 S. W. (2d) 424, 441 (1946) ; Hawkins v. Texas Company, 146 Tex. 511, 514, 209
S. W. (2d) 338, 340, (1948).
74 Mr. Hyder contends that this rule places the agency at a disadvantage because
private litigants are able to employ more experts than government agencies, and he
fears that the courts may conclude that the overwhelming weight of the evidence is
against the agency simply because the private litigants produced the most experts. This
fear seems unwarranted. The weight of expert testimony is seldom, if ever, established
merely on the basis of the number of experts appearing for each side.
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applied to the very record upon which the agency based its find-
ings. If the findings of the agency are not supported by substan-
tial evidence heard by it, the order of the agency based upon
such findings is clearly arbitrary. If the findings of the agency are
supported by substantial evidence heard by it, it is simply a ques-
tion of policy whether judicial review of fact issues should be so
proscribed where constitutional rights are not involved. But there
is little logic in restricting judicial review to a determination of
whether the evidence adduced on a retrial of fact issues before
the court contains substantial evidence to support the findings of
the agency. The trial judge has no way of knowing, absent receipt
in evidence of the transcript of the administrative proceedings,75
what evidence was considered by the agency in arriving at its
findings, or whether, had the agency heard the same evidence heard
by him, it would have reached the same conclusion. Yet he must
sustain the order if, on the trial of the issues before him, he finds
that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the order,
notwithstanding his own judicial evaluation of the evidence.
It is highly doubtful whether the legislature, in providing for
a trial de novo, or for a suit or trial as in other civil causes, as is
commonly the case in Texas,"6 contemplated any such limitation
upon the judicial function. A trial de novo requires not only a
full hearing of fact issues but the application of judicial judg-
ment to the evidence so adduced. Of course, statutory presump-
tions (or presumptions implied by law) must play their accus-
tomed role in the judicial evaluation of the facts, but to restrict
the trial judge to a determination of whether the record adduced
before him contains substantial evidence in support of an order
under attack plainly violates the legislative enjoinder to conduct the
trial, on review of administrative action, "as in other civil causes."
75 Evidence heard by the agency is not per se admissible. "Whether it is admissible
... must depend upon its own merits under the general rules of evidence, and without
regard to whether it had theretofore been introduced before the agency." Railroad Com-
mission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 80, 161 S. W. (2d) 1022, 1030 (1942) ; Hawkins
v. Texas Company, 146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. (2d) 338 (1948).
TO See notes 18 and 19, supra.
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It is at this point that the use of the word "reasonably" in the
statement of the rule becomes of special significance. It frequently
has been overlooked that in the first full exposition of the substan-
tial evidence rule in the Gulf Land Co. case" the Supreme Court
said that in determining whether the order of the agency is unrea-
sonable or arbitrary the trial court should consider whether the
action of the agency in its determination of the facts "is reasonably
supported by substantial evidence." In the Hawkins case 78 the court
re-emphasized the use of the word "reasonably," pointing out that
it gave to the judicial review a broader scope than it would have
if some substantial evidence were regarded as sufficient to sustain
the agency order. But the court did not elaborate upon this rather
general statement, and trial courts remain today without positive
guidance how to determine, as a matter of law, the reasonableness
of the support afforded by substantial evidence in particular cases.
Under the rule of the Hawkins case, the trial court, after hear-
ing all the evidence, must answer two inquiries: (1) does the
record, considered as a whole, contain substantial evidence in
support of the order of the agency, and (2) if so, does such evi-
dence reasonably support the order (or, more properly, the find-
ings of fact from which the order is derived). There must be some
reliable, probative, relevant-i.e., substantial-evidence in sup-
port of fact issues under challenge. That determination is sine qua
non, but preliminary, to the decisive question of whether such sub-
stantial evidence, considered as a whole, reasonably supports the
order of the agency. Hence, the basic problem is the meaning to be
given to the words "reasonably supports" in the statement of the
rule.
As has previously been pointed out, there is nothing to show
that in adopting the phraseology of substantial evidence, Texas
courts intended to work a radical, or any, departure from the
scope of review which had been applied theretofore. Although
"substantial evidence" was not mentioned in early decisions, the
77 Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S. W. (2d) 73 (1939)
71 Hawkins v. Texas Company, 146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. (2d) 338 (1948).
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courts were always careful to accord weight to the findings of
expert administrative bodies. Trial courts were not to substitute
their judgment for that of the agency, prima facie validity was
to be accorded the order of the agency, and the party complain-
ing was to have the burden of establishing by convincing proof
that the order of the agency was unreasonable or unjust. It is sub-
mitted that use of the words "reasonably supports" in the restate-
ment of the rule by the Supreme Court in the Hawkins case denotes
an equivalent test.
The substantial evidence rule in Texas administrative law
should not be considered as a rule of evidence, but as a rule of
reason-a statement of the balance between the judicial function
of deciding controverted fact issues affecting private rights and the
administrative function of regulating private activities within a
field prescribed by the legislature. The court should not displace
the agency in respect to such determinations; neither should it
abnegate its own responsibilities. The trial judge should apply
his "independent judgment" to the facts adduced before him on
the trial of the cause; otherwise he will fail to fulfill his proper
judicial function under statutes which assure parties a trial as in
other civil causes. But the burden should be upon the party com-
plaining of the administrative order to establish its unreasonable-
ness by convincing proof, and the order, issued after a full and
fair hearing, should be entitled to prima facie validity. The
trial judge should not substitute his own judgment for that of an
experienced agency; on the contrary, he should sustain the agency
if, in his judgment, reasonable men, in fairness and justice to
the complainant, could have arrived at the findings of fact implicit
in the order or action of the agency. In short, he should give par-
ties complainant approximately the scope of review which the
Supreme Court of the United States has prescribed for cases in
which constitutional rights depend upon fact determinations.
Acceptance of this interpretation of the rule of the Hawkins
case would establish consistency between the earliest and the most
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recent Texas cases dealing with scope of judicial review, eliminate
the present disparity between public utility rate cases and other
cases, and comply faithfully with the statutory scheme of de novo
trial, or suit or trial as in other civil causes; 9 and, while accord-
ing proper regard to the primacy of administrative agencies in
the field of their special competence, it would supply that high
quality of judicial review which is the best assurance against
administrative abuse of private rights.80
CONCLUSION
In its inception, the administrative process was bound to be
viewed with considerable suspicion by the judiciary, and to be
held in considerable disfavor by the bar. Although it may not have
been regarded with that fine admixture of scorn and contempt in
which the law judges held the chancellor before equity was ac-
cepted into the Anglo-American judicial system, its undoubted
faults have been the source of genuine concern to the legal pro.
fession. The administrative system indisputably is here to stay.
But if private rights are not to be submerged in the rising flood
of agency rules and orders, constant attention must be given to
the administrative process and constant effort must be expended
to insure its development in a manner consistent with traditional
concepts of fair play and justice.
The purpose of this paper has been to clarify a single aspect of
the administrative process as it is developing in Texas law,"' and
to point out the importance of an independent judicial evaluation
79 And it should help to prevent further legislative enjoinders against the "substan.
tial evidence rule." See note 69, supra.
80 This rule may not be suitable for the review of certain types of administrative
action in which exceptional discretion is properly lodged in the administrative agency
or officer, such as in the use of state-owned property, the granting of a privilege by the
state, or the exercise of summary action under the state's police power. In cases of this
type, statutes may properly restrict the courts to a determination of whether the action
in question is fraudulent, or wholly arbitrary or discriminatory. The issuance and revo-
cation of licenses to operate jitneys on the public streets, to run saloons or pool halls, or
to sell milk to the public, fall within these categories. See Moore v. Cox, 215 S. W. (2d)
666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board, 108 S. W. (2d) 300
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937), and Leach v. Coleman, 188 S. W. (2d) 220 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945) ; and cf. City of Coleman v. Rhone, 222 S. W. (2d) 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) and
Meaney v. Nueces County Nay. Dist. No. 1, 222 S. W. (2d) 402 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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of fact issues where judicial review of administrative action is
restricted to a new record adduced before the court. An obvious
objection to this plan of review is that it necessitates a complete
retrial of all fact issues. Witnesses who have testified at length
before the agency in the administrative hearing must be recalled
to repeat substantially the same evidence before the court. Further-
more, since whether the order of the agency is reasonably sup-
ported by substantial evidence adduced before the trial court is
a question of law,"2 appellate courts, in turn, must review the
entire transcript of the evidence in the trial court. And the appel-
late court problem is the more serious now that appeals in such
cases may be taken directly to the Supreme Court from the dis-
trict court.83
Another evil is implicit in this scheme of review. Since there
must be a complete retrial of fact issues in cases appealed to the
courts, the possibility exists that administrative agencies may be
less inclined than otherwise properly to conduct complete admin-
istrative hearings. Evidence may be held back against the possi-
bility of appeal to the courts, and agencies thus may become allied
with their prosecutors against private parties. In short, the em-
phasis upon the judicial hearing may adversely affect the quality
of the administrative hearing.
A practical solution of these difficulties is suggested by the
statutory scheme of review now prescribed for orders of the
Board of Insurance Commissioners relating to casualty insurance
and orders of the Secretary of State under the Securities Act, in
which review is restricted to the record adduced before the
s1 In a subsequent issue, problems of practice and procedure before Texas admin.
istrative agencies, including such matters as the right to jury trial, the necessity for
administrative fact findings, the right to compulsory process, etc., will he discussed.
s2 Thomas v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 145 Tex. 270, 198 S. W. (2d) 420 (1946);
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S. W. (2d) 424 (1946) ; Hawkins v. Texas
Company, 146 Tex. 511,209 S. W. (2d) 338 (1948) ; Wrather v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co., 147 Tex. 144, 214 S. W. (2d) 112 (1948).
83 TFx. CONST., Art. V, § 3-b; TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1738a;
Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 146 Tex. 286, 206 S. W. (2d) 235 (1947) ; Rail-
road Commission v. Sterling Oil & Refining Co., 147 Tex. 547, 218 S. W. (2d) 415
(1949) ; cl. McGraw v. Teichman, 147 Tex. 142,214 S. W. (2d) 282 (1948).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
agencies. 4 In the case of appeals from orders of the Secretary of
State, the statute provides that the court may itself hear additional
evidence. It is usually preferable, however, to provide that upon
a showing of newly-discovered evidence, or for other good and
sufficient reason, the court may remand the cause to the commis-
sion for the taking of further evidence and for reconsideration of
its findings and order in the light thereof.8 5 This plan would elimi-
nate the retrial of fact issues in the district courts and would, in
effect, establish them as first courts of appeal of administrative
orders. Alternatively, appeal could be authorized from the ad-
ministrative agency directly to the appellate courts, as in Okla-
homa,"' thereby further reducing the burden upon the courts. If
it were considered desirable policy, the substantial evidence rule,
as defined in federal practice, could then be applied where con-
stitutional rights were not involved with full logic to the record
adduced before the agency.
Before any such plan of review is given serious consideration
in Texas, it is perfectly evident that an administrative procedure
act will have to be adopted to insure full, fair, and legal hearings
before administrative agencies. It would be folly to consider any
plan of this sort, designed to relieve the courts of their present
burden of retrying administrative law cases, until and unless
adequate and certain methods of practice and procedure before
administrative agencies are provided by law. 7 The next step in
the improvement of the administrative system of Texas is the
enactment of legislation designed to accomplish that end.
s I See notes 66 and 67, supra.
s5 New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 335 (1947).
86 OKLA. CONST., Art. IX, § 20; OKLA. STATS. ANN., Title 52, § 113 (conservation of
oil and gas), Title 17, § 34 (gas companies and pipe lines), Title 17, § 155 (public
utility companies), Title 17, § 73 (transportation companies), etc.
" The Federal Administrative Procedure Act was enacted in 1946. On January 17,
1949, Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, introduced Senate Bill 527 to provide uniform rules of practice and pro-
cedure in federal administrative agencies. The following states have enacted adminis-
trative procedure acts: California, North Dakota, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Ohio, Illi-
nois. and Pennsylvania. The State Bar of Texas, through its Committee on Administra-
tive Law, is seeking the enactment of similar legislation for Texas.
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